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Since the 1969 Pearson Commission, there has been a standard
benchmark for the generosity of foreign aid programs: developed coun-
tries should donate at least seven-tenths of one per cent of their GDP. In
practice, however, relatively few countries have achieved this level of
generosity. Moreover, its foundations are easy to question. The target
was calculated more than forty years ago using a combination of the
Harrod–Domar model and ﬁnancial programming. This rather mechan-
ical approach would not command much support today.
In this paper, we introduce a new framework for studying optimal aid
policies.Wemodel foreign aid as a formof global redistribution. A utilitar-
ian, forward-looking social planner seeks tomaximize aweighted average
of welfare in the global North and the global South. The planner decides
on an optimal path of international transfers, anticipating that consump-
tion and investment decisions in the North and South will be made bye June 2013 conference of the
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. This is an open access article underoptimizing householdswithin each region. These households cannot bor-
row or lend internationally, and the scope for global redistribution is lim-
ited by diminishing returns to aid. This framework can be used to study
the optimal generosity of aid, and its relationship to absorptive capacity.
It can also be used to inform the timing of aid, and its allocation across
countries that differ in development levels. We describe circumstances
in which donors should seek to increase generosity over time, and exam-
ine whether middle-income countries should ever be a priority for aid.
Importantly, the framework is tractable and could be extended in many
directions; for example, it could be adapted to study the implications of
capital mobility for optimal aid policies.
The starting point is tomodel both the global North and South as neo-
classical Ramsey economies. These economies differ in their levels of TFP
and income, and in their distances from steady-state. Obstfeld (1999) an-
alyzed the effect of exogenous transfers on a Southern economy; in this
paper, that problemwill be nested within the problem facing a Northern
donor, so that the level and timing of transfers will be endogenously de-
termined. At ﬁrst glance, the Ramsey model may seem too stylized for
this purpose, since it neglects political economy forces that will often be
central to aid effectiveness. But the Ramsey model casts sharp light on a
direct consequence of aid ﬂows, which is to relax intertemporal resource
constraints. Studying this in isolation should enhance our understanding
of the choices facing donors.
A further motivation is the growing interest in cash transfers to
households as a form of poverty alleviation. Hanlon et al. (2010) argue
that transfers direct to households would be more beneﬁcial thanthe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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an ambitious Direct Beneﬁt Transfer scheme, intended eventually to re-
place multiple welfare programs with cash transfers to households.
Using evidence from randomized trials, Gertler et al. (2012) and
Haushofer and Shapiro (2013) ﬁnd that cash transfers to poor house-
holds are partly invested. It is therefore interesting to ask:what happens
when aid is used to relax household budget constraints, and what are
the implications for optimal aid policies?
In our framework, utility functions are concave and some global re-
distribution is optimal, but its extent will be constrained by diminishing
returns to aid. Obstfeld (1999) concluded that the welfare beneﬁt of
(exogenous) aidwasmodest evenwithout an aid absorption constraint,
but our analysis turns that logic on its head. If the donor is also seen as a
Ramsey economy, the opportunity cost of aid for the donor is similarly
modest. Hence, we sometimes ﬁnd that donors should be generous,
especially for recipient economies that are close to subsistence. The
welfare impact of aid may be substantial, and aid can be justiﬁed even
when a substantial fraction of it is wasted.
To investigate the quantitative implications, we use simulations.
Donor and recipient initial conditions are based on data from the Penn
World Table, combined with assumptions on structural parameters.
We consider isoelastic (CRRA) preferences and Stone–Geary ‘subsis-
tence consumption’preferences. Under Stone-Geary preferences, the ef-
fects of aid on investment and growth are especially strong, and the
donor maintains a higher level of aid generosity for a longer period.
The limits to recipient absorptive capacity play an important role
throughout. When recipients are capable of absorbing relatively high
levels of aid, the optimal path of aid is typically front-loaded. But if the
South lacks absorptive capacity, the North maywant to increase the gen-
erosity of its aid over time, relative to Northern GDP. This reﬂects our as-
sumption that, as the South develops, it can use aid more effectively. We
examine what happens if the donor nevertheless maintains aid as a ﬁxed
share of its GDP, as in the Pearson Commission benchmark, and compare
this to the fully-ﬂexible optimal path.We show that, perhaps surprisingly,
the welfare costs of restricting aid to a ﬁxed proportion of donor GDP are
often borne in equilibrium by the North, rather than the South.
Another issue of recent interest has beenwhether donors shouldmake
transfers to middle-income countries (see, for example, Kanbur and
Sumner, 2012). We therefore study what happens in the case of two aid
recipients, where one is a low-income country and one a middle-
income country with a larger population. Our simulations of optimal pol-
icies indicate large changes over time in aid generosity and in the division
of aid between recipients. Givendiminishing returns to aid intensity,most
of the aid may be directed at the middle-income recipient initially, with
the allocation later switching towards the smaller, poorer recipient.
Throughout the analysis, we assume that the capital account is
closed. This assumption is common in the literature, but some commen-
tators argue that poor countries do not need aid when investment can
be ﬁnanced by capital inﬂows. In practice, capital has tended to ﬂow
to middle-income countries rather than the poorest countries. And
even when the capital account is open, there is still a role for aid, to ﬁ-
nance both consumption and the accumulation of assets owned domes-
tically. It is likely that the welfare gains from aid would be less in this
case, since initial consumption is higher; nevertheless, ﬁnancing higher
consumption would remain valuable. The quantitative investigation of
this would be an interesting topic for future research.1
Since themodel is stylized, it is worth clarifying the intended contri-
bution. The paper provides a newway of framing the decision problems
facing aid donors. The model could be extended, and made more1 It is surprising that few papers on international transfers have considered them along-
side capitalmobility; exceptions include Galor and Polemarchakis (1987). Growthmodels
under capital mobility were discussed by Rebelo (1992). The study by Caselli and Feyrer
(2007) ﬁnds that returns to capital are broadly comparable in a sample of 53 countries,
but their sample contains relatively few low-income countries, and only seven countries
are in sub-Saharan Africa. In the later study by Lowe et al. (2013), even their extended
sample has only ten low-income countries.realistic, in many directions; it is a ﬁrst step towards richer quantitative
frameworks that could inform future aid policies. The current simula-
tions serve twomore limited aims. The ﬁrst is to investigate some qual-
itative results about aid policies when absorption constraints matter:
these results are not special cases, but can emerge as important under
reasonable parameter assumptions. The second aim is to illustrate
what might be learnt by future research using more complicated
models. For example, the current analysis is too preliminary to suggest
a replacement for the Pearson Commission benchmark, but it draws
attention to some relevant considerations. A companion paper, Carter
(2014), uses related ideas to study aid allocation rules of the type some-
times implemented by donors.
The existing literature has generally considered simpler models of
North–South interactions, often in models with just one or two periods.
The majority of this work is theoretical, and studies the effects of
exogenous transfers rather than deriving their optimal time path.
Somepapers explore the transfer problem, and especially the possibility
of transfer paradoxes driven by terms-of-trade effects; Eaton (1989)
surveys the older literature. An alternative approach is taken by
Chamon and Kremer (2009), who construct a multi-country model in
which developing countries gradually integrate with the world econo-
my. They discuss the potential role of aid in accelerating this process,
but aid is not included in the version of the model they calibrate.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section provides the for-
mal description and analysis of the donor's decision problem. Section 3
describes the assumptions used in our simulations. Section 4 presents
initial analysis of the optimal path of aid and Section 5 extends the anal-
ysis to subsistence economies. Section 6 considers two recipients which
differ in population size and income. Section 7 carries out a sensitivity
analysis and discusses potential extensions, before Section 8 concludes.
2. The model
Our paper deliberately takes a narrow view of the donor's problem,
seen exclusively in terms of international resource transfers. We hope to
show that even this narrowviewcould inform thedesign of aid programs.
Since the 1960s, cumulative spending on foreign aid has exceeded three
trillion dollars in nominal terms, a ﬁgure that would be even higher in
today's prices. Yet basic issues remain contested and, in some cases, rarely
studied. Howgenerous should aid ﬂows be, and should donors choose aid
targets relative to donor resources, or to recipient GDP? To what degree
should this generosity be greater, early in the development process?
When allocating aid across multiple recipients, how sensitive should aid
ﬂows be to recipient income levels? These are all debates that can be in-
formed by the approach that we develop here.
We use the framework to revisit some long-standing questions.
Some of these questions concern the Pearson Commission benchmark,
which appeared in United Nations Resolution number 2626, from
October 1970. The 0.70% target was originally justiﬁed using a ﬁnancing
gap calculation, based on assessed capital needs for a Harrod–Domar
economy (see Clemens and Moss, 2007, for a full history). It seems un-
satisfactory to base aid policies on a model and form of analysis that are
clearly outdated. Even the basic assumption that aid should be a ﬁxed
share of donor GDP might not be supported by a more rigorous
approach.We agree with Clemens andMoss (2007) that it seems back-
wards to determine aid levels based on the size of donors, rather than
conditions in recipient economies. The optimal degree of redistribution
should be dependent on the extent of between-country differences, the
nature of preferences, and the extent of absorption constraints, all of
which play a role in our analysis.
We formulate the North's decisions in terms of an explicit dynamic
optimization problem. The North decides on an optimal path of
transfers to the South. As in Obstfeld (1999), aid will beneﬁt Southern
economies in twoways. Aid accelerates the rate atwhich the South con-
verges to its steady-state, and allows the South to sustain a higher level
of consumption than otherwise. Stripping the aid problem down to
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tion decisions. In our simulations, we ﬁnd that accelerating convergence
to steady-state plays only a minor role. This does not mean the aid is
wasted, however. In a model of this type, aid is effective to the extent
that it raises consumption immediately, later, or both.2
In our framework, theNorthern donor seeks tomaximize the follow-
ing objective function:
max
cNt ;atf g
Z ∞
0
u cNtð Þe−ρtdt þω  LS
Z ∞
0
u cStð Þe−ρtdt
where cNt is per capita consumption in the North, cSt is per capita con-
sumption in the South, u(⋅) is the instantaneous utility function, at is
aid, ω is the relative weight that the North places on the utility of the
South, LS is the relative population of the South, and ρ is the discount
rate. The choice of aid will matter through intertemporal resource con-
straints: aid transfers will reduce the resources available to the North,
and increase those available to the South. Taking this into account, we
derive the path for aid which maximizes the objective function when
all households are optimizing over time. We achieve this by nesting
the South's optimal control problemwithin the optimal control problem
of the North.
Framing the donor's problem as one of weighted global welfare
maximization has several advantages. First, the opportunity costs of
aid arise endogenously from the structure of themodel. Second, our ap-
proach provides a mapping between an explicit weight ω on Southern
utility and optimal aid policies.3 We can readily study normative ques-
tions: how generous should aid be, andwhat does the optimal timepro-
ﬁle look like?
We now set out the decision problems formally. The North and
South are both characterized as Ramsey economies. We study the
South's problem ﬁrst, and then the optimal control problem facing the
Northern donor, where the optimizing behavior of the South represents
a constraint in the North's decision problem. To simplify the presenta-
tion, initially we set the rates of technical progress and population
growth to zero, but the necessary extensions are straightforward.
We assume that aid is ultimately distributed to Southern house-
holds, and these are individually too small to internalize the effects of
their actions on donor policies. Hence, we can consider the donor's
problem without needing to allow strategic interactions between
donors and (multiple) recipients. That would require analysis in terms
of a dynamic game, and would not be straightforward. For the same
reason, we do not model political economy forces explicitly, but these
simpliﬁcations allow an analysis that is richer in other ways.
2.1. The decision problem for the South
Decision problems for the South have previously been considered by
Chatterjee et al. (2003), Obstfeld (1999) and Turnovsky (2009), among
others. In our case, the representative Southern household is assumed
to solve:
max
cStf g
Z ∞
0
u cStð Þe−ρtdt
subject to : k

St ¼ AS f S kStð Þ þ g at ;ϰStð Þ−cSt−δkSt
kS0 given;
where kSt is household capital per worker and ϰSt is aggregate capital
per worker in the South, and at is aid. The non-standard aspect of the
South's decision problem is the role for absorption constraints, in2 For poorer countries, higher consumption should hardly be considered wasteful: it is
likely to mean improvements in nutrition, shelter, and personal health, among other wel-
fare beneﬁts. Moreover, these forms of consumption may inﬂuence current or future pro-
ductivity, as in Steger (2000, 2002).
3 These two advantages contrast with, for example, Scholl (2009). In several respects
her analysis is richer than ours, but it is less well-suited to studying normative questions.reduced form. Aid enters the South's intertemporal resource constraint
through the ‘aid impact function’ g(⋅). This function depends on endog-
enous variables, aid and capital, and also on exogenous variables such as
the relative population and TFP of the South; we typically suppress the
dependence on exogenous variables for notational simplicity. We
assume that g 0;ϰStð Þ ¼ 0, and that g(⋅) is non-decreasing in ϰSt and
has strictly diminishing marginal returns to at.
Political economy approaches often imply that some aid is wasted or
diverted. Rather than develop a speciﬁc structuralmodel, our aid impact
function translates Northern aid donations into the actual transfers re-
ceived by Southern households, allowing for wastage or diversion.4
Our formulation nests the case where the marginal beneﬁt of aid is de-
clining in aid intensity, the ratio of aid to recipient GDP. This idea has
often been investigated empirically, as in Burnside and Dollar (2000)
and Clemens et al. (2012).5 One possible story is that, as aid intensity in-
creases, so does the proportion of aid that iswasted or appropriated by a
local elite. High aid intensity may also lead to Dutch Disease effects. It
could have adverse effects on a domestic political equilibrium, partly
by inﬂuencing rents to sovereignty, and perhaps by undermining
long-term accountability and state capacity. A proliferation of aid
projects and programs could overwhelm the capacity of the recipient
government. These mechanisms have been widely discussed (see, for
example, Temple (2010)). As a consequence, it seems essential to
allow for limits to absorptive capacity. In our framework, these limits
are eased by growth: as the GDP of an aid recipient increases, the
recipient can use a given amount of aid more effectively.
The representative Southern household takes the paths of aid at and
aggregate capital per worker ϰSt as given (hence, the Southern house-
holds do not internalize the effect of their investment decisions on
future aid absorption). The above problem leads to the Euler equation:
c

St
cSt
¼− 1
εu0 cð Þ
AS f
0
S kStð Þ−ρ−δ
 
: ð1Þ
where εu0 cð Þ is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consump-
tion. Note that this Euler equation is standard, precisely because the
Southern households do not internalize the economy-wide beneﬁts of
their investment decisions. Hence, the Southern households invest too
little; a Southern planner would front-load investment to improve fu-
ture aid absorption. The South's Euler equation would then be given by:
c

St
cSt
¼− 1
εu0 cð Þ
AS f
0
S kStð Þ þ g02 at ;ϰStð Þ−ρ−δ
 
: ð2Þ
where kSt ¼ ϰSt at each instant.
In theﬁrst version of the South's problem, the donor's optimal policy is
not time-consistent, due to the externality. We followmuch of the litera-
ture on conditionality, and assume that the donor has access to a commit-
ment technology. This could take the form of explicit commitments to aid
made through domestic legislation or international agreements that
would be costly to reverse. This simpliﬁes the analysis, and is relatively
natural given our interest in normative questions. Further, in the cases
considered below, the quantitative effects of the externality will be
modest.
2.2. The decision problem for the North
We now consider the North's decision problem, ﬁrst for the case
with a Southern planner, so that Eq. (2) is the relevant Euler equation.
The North's decisions must respect kSt ¼ ϰSt . The Northern planner4 Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (1997) used a similar idea in their study of aid allocation
across economies that vary in their trade policies. The terminology ‘aid impact function’ is
taken from Dudley and Montmarquette (1976), which used a related idea. Kemp and
Wong (1993) considered the transfer problem when a ﬁxed proportion of aid is wasted.
5 See Sumner and Mallett (2013) and Temple (2010) for further discussion and
references.
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max
cNt ;atf g
Z ∞
0
u cNtð Þ þω  LS  u cStð Þ½   e−ρtdt
subject to : k

Nt ¼ f N kNtð Þ−cNt−at−δkNt
k

St ¼ AS f S kStð Þ þ g at ; kStð Þ−cSt−δkSt
c

St
cSt
¼− 1
εu0 cð Þ
AS f
0
S kStð Þ þ g02 at ; kStð Þ−ρ−δ
 
;
kS0; kN0 given; cS0 free
where we have normalized the TFP of the North to unity.6 This formula-
tion rules out time-zero transfers of part of the North's capital stock: see
Kemp et al. (1990). We can now derive some results. We denote the
current-value costate variables associated with kNt, kSt and cSt as xNt, xSt
and zSt, respectively. In this context, each costate variable can be
interpreted as the (current-value) shadow value the North would
attach to a one-unit increment in the corresponding state variable.
The associated optimality conditions are as follows.7 The ﬁrst-order
condition for cNt is the usual one: u′(cNt)= xNt. The ﬁrst-order condition
for at is:
xNt ¼ g01 at ; kStð ÞxSt−
zStcSt
εu0 cð Þ
g″12 at ; kStð Þ: ð3Þ
The three Euler equations are:
x

Nt ¼ ρþ δ− f 0N kNtð Þ
 
xNt ð4Þ
x

St ¼ ρþ δ−AS f 0S kStð Þ−g02 at ; kStð Þ
 
xSt þ
zStcSt
εu0 cð Þ
AS f
″
S kStð Þ þ g″22 at ; kStð Þ
n o
ð5Þ
z

St ¼ ρþ
1
εu0 cð Þ
AS f
0
S kStð Þ þ g02 at ; kStð Þ−ρ−δ
 ( )
zSt þ xSt−ωLSu0 cStð Þ ð6Þ
Optimality at the initial date further requires zS0 = 0.8 In fact, the
Northern planner's problem has a solution with zSt ≡ 0 at all dates. The
Southern planner internalizes the capital externality, and the shadow
value of Southern capital is the same for both planners. The level of
aid is pinned down by the ﬁrst-order condition (3). The solution is
time-consistent, as the South values capital in the same way as the
Northern planner.
We now consider what happens if the South is not run by a planner,
and investment decisions are made by households. Then Eq. (1) re-
places Eq. (2) as the last dynamic constraint in the Northern planner's
problem. Again requiring kSt ¼ ϰSt at each instant, the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion for aid becomes:
xNt ¼ g01 at ; kStð ÞxSt; ð7Þ6 Note that, for simplicity,we posit a Northernplanner that choosesNorthern consump-
tion aswell as aid.We could instead allow individual Northern households to choose their
consumption paths (but not aid); that formulation would ultimately be equivalent in the
current setting.
7 We assume throughout that the necessary conditions for optimality will indeed char-
acterize an optimal solution. It is not straightforward to establish that these conditions are
sufﬁcient in this particular case, given the free initial condition of one of the state variables,
discussed below.
8 This is the extra transversality condition required for optimality, given the free initial
condition for one of the state variables: cS0 is not ﬁxed because it partly depends on the
North's choices. Note, however, that the feasible outcomes for cS0 remain constrained by
the intertemporal resource constraints and the Euler equation for Southern consumption.
See (Léonard and Long, 1992), chapter 7, especially section 7.7.The Euler equation for xSt is:
x

St ¼ ρþ δ−AS f 0S kStð Þ−g02 at ; kStð Þ
 
xSt þ
zStcSt
εu0 cð Þ
AS f
″
S kStð Þ; ð8Þ
and the Euler equation for zSt ﬁnally becomes:
z

St ¼ ρþ
1
εu0 cð Þ
AS f
0
S kStð Þ−ρ−δ
 ( )
zSt þ xSt−ωLSu0 cStð Þ ð9Þ
Again optimality requires zS0 = 0, but no solution exists with zSt ≡ 0.
The Northern planner's Euler Eq. (8) would then be incompatible
with the South's Euler Eq. (1) because of the capital externality. (For
example, one can see that zS N 0 in the steady-state.) The externality
leads to time inconsistency. The social returns to capital are higher
than perceived by Southern households, given the beneﬁts of higher
output for aid absorption. Tomaintain the returns to capital and encour-
age capital accumulation, the Northern planner is less generous to the
decentralized South than it would be to a social planner in the South.
But at later dates, in the wake of past investment, the Northern planner
would like to transfer additional aid in order to increase Southern con-
sumption. Hence, the North's aid decision is time inconsistent.
The model based on decentralized investment decisions is arguably
more realistic, and will be the focus of our simulations. When we later
examine the contrasting case of a Southern planner, the optimal gener-
osity of aid is similar, but with higher investment in the early stages of
the transition. These effects are quantitatively modest, suggesting that
time-consistent aid paths would not look greatly different from those
under full commitment. As noted earlier, we assume that the donor
can commit to an entire path for aid ﬂows, and leave the investigation
of time-consistent aid policies to future work, perhaps using the
approach of Cohen and Michel (1988).
Contributions related to ours include Kopczuk et al. (2005), Weyl
(2014) and especially Kemp et al. (1990). The latter paper uses optimal
control methods to study the timing and generosity of aid needed to
maximize weighted global welfare, just as we do. A crucial difference
with our paper is that, although they brieﬂy acknowledge the possibility
of absorption constraints, they do not analyze them. Instead, they con-
centrate on the case where the South's resource constraint is linear in
aid. They show that, at time zero, the optimal policy involves a transfer
of part of theNorth's capital stock to the South.9 In ourwork,we rule out
stock transfers, a step which is a natural counterpart to the assumption
of absorption constraints, as they note. A further difference is that Kemp
et al. (1990) is purely theoretical, whereas we present quantitative re-
sults based on simulations.
2.3. The steady-state
We brieﬂy discuss some properties of the steady-state, considering
ﬁrst the case of a social planner in the South. The ﬁrst-order conditions
and Euler equations for the dynamic problem, solved for the steady-
state, lead to equations which implicitly deﬁne the steady-state level
of aid, a∗, and consumption and capital for both North and South:
u0 cN
  ¼ ω  LS  g01 a; kS u0 cS 
f 0 kN
  ¼ ρþ δ
AS f
0 kS
  ¼ ρþ δ−g02 a; kS 
cN ¼ f kN
 
−a−δkN
cS ¼ f kS
 þ g a; kS −δkS
The ﬁrst equation has a natural interpretation: the Northern donor
balances the marginal cost of aid – represented by the marginal utility9 For a textbook presentation of their results, see Brakman and van Marrewijk (1998).
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namely the marginal utility of Southern consumption weighted by ω
and LS, and multiplied by the derivative of the aid impact function
with respect to aid.10 Under our assumptions, the equation has some in-
teresting implications when parameters are such that cN∗ N cS∗. First,
under absorption constraints, it is not optimal to equalize steady-state
marginal utilities even when ω = 1. Second, it can be shown that
steady-state aid is increasing inω, as expected. Third, another simple re-
sult applies under isoelastic preferences: steady-state aid is decreasing
in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. All of these results are in
line with intuition.
For the alternative case where Southern consumption decisions are
decentralized to households, the steady-state solution takes a more
complicated form:
u0 cN
 
1þ ρεu0 cSð Þg
0
2 a

; kSð Þ
cSAS f
00 kS
 
" #
¼ ω  LS  g01 a; kS
 
u0 cS
 
f 0 kN
  ¼ ρþ δ
AS f
0 kS
  ¼ ρþ δ
cN ¼ f kN
 
−a−δkN
cS ¼ f kS
 þ g a; kS −δkS
Here the externality, the effect of capital accumulation in the South
on aid absorption, leads to awedge term in the equilibrium ratio ofmar-
ginal utilities, represented by the term in square brackets. This term is
greater than one, and keeps the marginal utilities further apart than in
the Southern planning case. This is because a Southern planner would
tend to choose a higher steady-state capital stock, allowing improved
aid absorption and higher Southern consumption in steady-state. The
effect becomes unimportant, and the model approaches the planning
case, when the derivative g2′(a∗, kS∗) is close to zero. Otherwise, the im-
portance of the externality is increasing in ρ and the absolute value of
εu0 cSð Þ and decreasing in AS and the absolute value of f″(kS
∗).
In this version of the model, both kS∗ and kN∗ are determined by exog-
enous parameters and independent of aid ﬂows. If wemake explicit the
dependence of cN∗ and cS∗ on aid, we have:
u0 cN a
   1þ ρεu0 cSð Þg02 a; kSð Þ
cS a
ð ÞAS f ″ kS
 
" #
¼ ω  LS  g01 a; kS
 
u0 cS a
  
which is a single equation in a single unknown, the equilibrium aid ﬂow
a∗. The right-hand-side of the expression is decreasing in aid. Further,
the left-hand-side is increasing in aid for the case we consider in our
simulations, with isoelastic preferences, a speciﬁc g a;ϰSð Þ function
and strictly positive steady-state aid. These results imply that, when
the Northern donor places a higher weight ω on Southern welfare,
this must lead to higher aid in steady-state. It can also be shown that a
larger relative population in the South (higher LS) andhigher total factor
productivity in the North lead to higher steady-state aid.11
In other respects, the externality complicates the comparative stat-
ics. We saw earlier that, with isoelastic preferences, increasing the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution reduces the extent of global re-
distribution, as expected. But this is not always true in the version of
the model with an externality. In principle, there could be reasonable
functional forms and parameter values for which steady-state aid is in-
creasing in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution over some range.
This counter-intuitive possibility arises because the externality-related
wedge termdepends on the elasticity. Since the effects of the externality
are modest in our simulations, we do not pursue this question further.10 Although itmay seemodd that themarginal utility in the South isweighted by LS, note
that typically the aid impact function will deﬂate aid by the population of the South, and
hence the LS term in the ﬁrst equation will be offset by the implicit dependence of the de-
rivative g1′(a∗, kS∗) on 1/LS.
11 We phrase this result in terms of Northern TFP, because results for Southern TFP are
harder to derive.The structure of the model does not rule out negative transfers. In
fact, for a sufﬁciently low weight ω on Southern welfare, the North
may choose to transfer income from the South to the North (‘negative
aid’) at some points in time. This never happens in our simulations for
the values of ω that we consider, but would emerge for weights close
to zero. A richer analysis, at the expense of greater complexity, would ei-
ther constrain aid to be non-negative— this is what Kemp et al. (1990)
call the ‘non-cooperative’ case — or modify the aid impact function so
that negative transfers are costly for the North to implement.
Note that, in our simulations, both the South and North will start
below their respective balanced growth paths. We could assume that
the North is on its balanced growth path and decides to donate a ﬁxed
share of its GDP, so that aid to the South grows steadily over time.
This would remove the need to model the North explicitly, and Carter
(2014) and Carter and Temple (2014) use this simpliﬁcation. But if we
want to study aid generosity, and allow the share of aid in Northern
GDP to change over time, then the more general approach of this
paper is useful. Aid generosity has implications for Northern consump-
tion, and modeling the North explicitly is a natural way to capture the
time-varying opportunity cost of aid.
3. Simulation assumptions
We now describe the assumptions used in our simulations. As we
noted earlier, the simulations that we present are best seen as prelimi-
nary. This is partly because themodel is stylized, and partly because the
appropriate parameter choices are uncertain. The simulations illustrate
what might be learnt from richer quantitative analyses in the future. In
the past, the broad principles of aid programs, and some of their details,
have often drawn on rather simple and unsatisfactory models, as
Easterly (1999) emphasizes.
For the instantaneous utility function, we ﬁrst adopt isoelastic
(CRRA) preferences:
u cð Þ ¼ c
1−σ−1
1−σ
where the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption
is − σ, and σ is the reciprocal of the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution.
Theparameter choices for preferences are relatively straightforward.
We assume that σ is equal to two, a common choice in the literature.12
We set the discount rate ρ equal to 0.03; this corresponds to the choices
of Obstfeld (1999) and Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006). Note that both σ
and ρ will inﬂuence the optimal generosity of aid.
For simplicity, we assume that donors and recipients have access to a
Cobb–Douglas technology with a common exponent on capital, but dif-
ferent levels of TFP. We assume the exponent on capital is 0.50. This is
higher than most estimates of physical capital's share of income, but
some authors argue that a broader notion of capital is needed for neo-
classical growth models to be consistent with the data: see Mankiw
et al. (1992) and, especially, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Our choice
of 0.50 has been used in related contexts, such as in Kraay and Raddatz
(2007). The choice matters because it will inﬂuence the speed at which
the South converges to its steady-state, and the rate at which the mar-
ginal product of capital falls along the transition.
To explore the predictions of the model, we also need to make as-
sumptions about the long-run growth rates of GDP per capita and pop-
ulation, the size of the South relative to the North, and their initial
capital–output ratios. Data on output, investment and population are
taken from the Penn World Table version 6.3. We estimate the capital
stock for 110 countries using the perpetual inventory method over the12 See Kraay and Raddatz (2007) for some references to empirical estimates. Obstfeld
(1999) uses σ= 2.5.
Table 1
Calibration.
N S S′ S1 S2
Population (L) 901 4844 2393 680 4164
Capital Stock (K) 103,600 56,030 25,900 1320 54,710
Output (Y) 31,410 28,050 13,330 1070 26,990
K/Y 3.30 2.00 1.94 1.23 2.03
α 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
k 10.88 3.99 3.78 1.52 4.11
k* 11.891 11.891 11.891 11.891 11.891
k/k* 0.915 0.336 0.317 0.128 0.346
ρ 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
σ 2 2 2 2 2
g 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
n 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
δ 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
A 1 0.274 0.271 0.121 0.325
(Y/L)/(YN/LN) 1 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.19
L/LN 1 5.376 2.656 0.755 4.622
14
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adopting their depreciation rate of 0.06.
We then aggregate countries into two units, the global North (the
donor) and the global South (the recipient). The 33 countries aggregat-
ed into the Northern economy are those with output per capita above
20,000 in 2007 international (PWT) dollars, while the remainder are
classed as the South. For our initial investigations, we sometimes
exclude China and India, with their large populations.13 This keeps the
quantitative analysis comparable with the aid decisions made in prac-
tice. As is well known, aid receipts per capita are low for China and
India, partly reﬂecting the ‘small country bias’ in aid allocation; exclud-
ing these two countries helps to keep the model close to the data. This
leaves us with an aid recipient whose population size is 2.7 times that
of the donor, denoted S′ in Table 1. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 1,
S1 and S2, show the South sub-divided into low and middle income re-
cipients, for use in Section 6.
The cut-off of 20,000 international dollars roughly corresponds to
the upper quartile of the GDP per capita distribution. We then calculate
total output, capital stock and population for the two regions, for the
most recent year in the PWT 6.3 data (2007), making no distinction
between population and labor force. This procedure yields a capital–
output ratio for each region. Sincewe assume Cobb–Douglas production
functions for both North and South, the capital–output ratios imply the
initial levels of capital per effective worker. We can then infer the
relative TFP and GDP per capita of the South.
We assume that rates of technical progress and population growth
are the same for donor and recipient, helping to ensure a balanced
growth path. The ﬁrst assumption is common in the empirical growth
literature. We adopt a rate of technical progress of 2% a year, as in
Mankiw et al. (1992). This is also approximately the average growth
rate in our Northern group of countries for the most recent decade in
the data. The assumption that population grows at the same rate in
donor and recipient can be justiﬁed as a long-run outcome, given that
population growth rates are falling in the developingworld.We assume
that the long-run population growth rate is 1.5% a year. This is approx-
imately the average rate over the last decade in the Southern group of
countries, but somewhat higher than in theNorth over the sameperiod.
Under these assumptions, the North begins the simulation with capital
per effective worker about 10% below its steady-state value (see the
‘N’ column of Table 1).
One of the main uncertainties relates to the severity of absorption
constraints. As noted earlier, there are several reasonswhy themarginal
beneﬁt of aidmight be declining in aid intensity, the ratio of aid to recip-
ient GDP. We capture this idea by multiplying aid by a simple ‘wastage’13 From the set of possible recipients, we also drop a handful of Eastern European coun-
tries and some smaller countries for which data are unavailable.function: a proportion of aid is wasted, and this proportion is increasing
in aid intensity. This drives a (potentially time-varying)wedge between
the transfer made by the North, and the aid received by households in
the South. Our chosen functional form, mapping aid at into transfers to
households, is:
g at ;ϰStð Þ ¼
at
LSt
1− at
υYS ϰStð Þ
 	
ð10Þ
where YS ϰStð Þ is output in the South, and higher values of υ correspond
to greater aid effectiveness for any given capital–labor ratio. The growth
rate of capital is then a quadratic function of aid intensity, which is par-
allel to the empirical literature, where growth is sometimes a quadratic
function of aid intensity; see Clemens et al. (2012) for a recent example.
A convenient way of interpreting this function is to ask when aid in-
tensity at/YSt is sufﬁciently high that the marginal beneﬁt of aid is zero
for the South. This happens when at/YSt= υ/2. The appropriate severity
of this absorption constraint is amatter of debate. In our baseline, we set
υ so that an extra dollar of aid has zero impactwhen the aid/GDP ratio is
25%.14
A ﬁnal choice relates to ω, the relative weight of Southern utility in
the objective function of the North. The use of such a weight seems es-
sential to any normative study of transfers between the North and
South.We are not seeking to estimate theweight that Northern citizens
currently adopt, nor to defend a particular choice ofω on prior grounds.
Instead, our framework provides amapping between assumptions onω
and optimal aid generosity. A possible parallel would be with Kopczuk
et al. (2005), who build on the earlier work of Mirrlees (1971): these
papers allow amapping between alternative degrees of inequality aver-
sion and tax rate schedules. In our simulations, we choose a baseline
weight ω= 0.1 to represent a donor that is genuinely altruistic, but
imperfectly so. We will investigate later how optimal aid changes
when ω takes higher values. As we will see, even the choice of
ω= 0.1 — so that Northern citizens have ten times the welfare weight
of Southern citizens — can lead to shares of aid in Northern GDP sub-
stantially higher than in the data.
3.1. Welfare analysis
To compare the lifetime utilities associated with different consump-
tion paths, we use Hicksian Equivalent Variation (HEV) as in Gourinchas
and Jeanne (2006). Hence our welfare results, in moving from one life-
time utility to another, are expressed in terms of the constant propor-
tional change in consumption at each instant that would generate the
new level of utility. Under isoelastic preferences, this is given by:
λ ¼ Uaid
Uaid¼0
 	 1
1−σ
−1
if σ≠ 1, and λ ¼ eρ Uaid−Uaid¼0ð Þ−1 otherwise. Depending on the simula-
tion experiment, we sometimes calculate this measure for the South in
isolation, and sometimes for the Northern donor's objective function,
including the weight ω.
4. Optimal aid policies
In this section, we study the optimal time path for aid using simula-
tions. To do this, we use the relaxation algorithm of Trimborn et al.
(2008) to solve the system of differential equations implied by the opti-
mal control solution. In our baseline case, aid generosity should be
highest at the beginning, so that the South accelerates towards its
steady-state. But this front-loading result is sensitive to absorptionOur chosen functional form implies that, beyond this level of aid intensity, themargin-
al beneﬁt of aid is negative. This would not be plausible for some interpretations of the aid
impact function. Under a pure ‘wastage’ interpretation, a functional form in which the
marginal beneﬁt declines to zero would be preferable; see Carter (2014).
Fig. 1. Baseline case; decentralized version. The panel ‘Aid paths’ shows the optimal path of aid over time, relative to Northern and SouthernGDP. The gap between gross and net aid in the
South represents wastage. The two right-hand panels show consumption and output in the South relative to the North, an upward slope signifying convergence. In both panels conver-
gence under optimal aid (dashed line) is compared to a zero-aid counterfactual (autarky, solid line). The bottom-left panel shows the difference aidmakes to the Southern net saving rate
compared to autarky.
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generosity of its aid (relative to its GDP) as the South grows, since the
South can then absorb a given level of aid more effectively.
The ﬁrst panel of Fig. 1 shows the optimal path of aid in our baseline
case. Aid relative to Northern GDP is initially 7.1%, falling to 4% after 17
years and to 2.4% in steady-state. Aid ﬂows on this scale are clearly too
high to be realistic, and were not seen even under the Marshall Plan.15
Importantly, however, long-run generosity is highly sensitive to the as-
sumed curvature of the utility function. If we reduce σ by just 10%, to
σ = 1.8, the North will continue to be generous early on, but much
less so at longer horizons. Hence, diminishing returns to consumption
can provide a powerful motivation for international transfers, but at
longer horizons, parameter assumptions matter a great deal.
Moreover, it is likely that the North places even less weight on the
utility of the South than we are currently assuming. There are other
possible reasons for the divergence between the model and the ﬂows
observed in practice. We do not model the marginal cost of public
funds: aid is ﬁnanced by lump-sum taxation rather than distortionary
taxes. Nor do we incorporate any political economy constraints on the
donor, such as taxpayer resistance to large international transfers.
Hence, natural extensions to our model would yield smaller ratios of
aid to Northern GDP for given values of ω and σ.
Aid intensity in the South is initially 16.8%, falling to 3.3% in the long
run. Fig. 1 also shows the effect of aid on the rate at which Southern out-
put and consumption converge towards Northern levels, and the effect
of aid on the Southern saving rate (expressed as the deviation from a
zero-aid counterfactual). The front-loading of aid enables the South to
raise consumption by 14.4% immediately.15 For comparison, the Marshall Plan entailed aid generosity of just over one per cent of
US GDP on average, over the years it operated (Crafts, 2013).The effect of aid on growth is familiar from Obstfeld (1999): there is
an initial, but modest, acceleration which is eventually followed by
slower growth relative to the autarky counterfactual. Growth is ulti-
mately slower because aid brings capital accumulation forward, so
that capital is accumulated quickly early on and more slowly later.
Even though aid intensity is high in this baseline calibration, the effect
on output growth is small. In annual terms, the initial growth rate is
0.57 percentage points higher, with the difference eliminated after 14
years; roughly 25 years later, the growth rate is 0.08 percentage points
lower than it would have been without aid.
It may seem surprising that the growth andwelfare effects of aid are
not larger. It is clear that, with isoelastic utility, exogenous transfers of
this magnitude have only limited effects on optimal investment. The
explanation is that, when the beneﬁts of investment are high, it will
be undertaken even in the absence of transfers, because forgoing con-
sumption is not costly under these preferences. Hence Obstfeld (1999)
ﬁnds modest growth effects, and he notes (p. 136) that the result is
‘likely to be a robust feature of any plausible model in which aid is
funneled through the private sector’.16
More broadly, our results on welfare effects are also consistent with
the work of Gourinchas and Jeanne (2006) on capital mobility. They
showed that the welfare beneﬁts of capital inﬂows in a calibrated
Ramseymodel are unexpectedly modest. This is partly because conver-
gence will be rapid even in the absence of foreign capital, and partly be-
cause accumulating capital more rapidly brings forward a reduction in
its marginal product. This intuition is helpful in understanding why
the effects of aid on productivity are also relatively modest in our set-
ting. But in the case of aid, we can take this logic further: if relaxing16 Larger effects on investment and growth can obtain under Stone–Geary preferences,
when relaxing the intertemporal resource constraint becomes more valuable. We exam-
ine this case later in the paper.
Fig. 2. Decentralized a/Yn, varying absorptive capacity (υ). Optimal paths of aid relative to Northern GDP, as Southern absorptive capacity varies, for two degrees of Northern altruism.
Smaller values of υ correspond to a tighter absorption constraint, with higher levels of waste at low levels of aid intensity. In the left-hand panel the Northern planner places a weight
of ω= 0.1 on Southern utility, ω= 0.5 in the right-hand panel.
Fig. 3. Decentralized a/Yn, varying Northern altruism ω. Optimal paths of aid relative to Northern GDP, with Northern altruism increasing in ω, for two degrees of Southern absorptive
capacity. In the left-hand panel Southern absorptive capacity is low, υ= 0.2, and higher in the right-hand panel υ= 1 .
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likely that tightening theNorth's resource constraint is not all that costly
to the North. This is why we ﬁnd large transfers to be optimal, even
though the productivity beneﬁts of a given transfer are limited.
Scenarios inwhich aid increases over time are shown in Figs. 2 and 3.
For some combinations of ω (the weight on the South's utility) and υ
(the aid absorption parameter) it may be optimal for the North to
back-load aid: as the South develops, it becomes better able to use aid
effectively, and the North should increase the generosity of aid relative
to its GDP.
What happens if the North gives a ﬁxed share of its GDP, as in the
Pearson Commission 0.70% benchmark?When theﬁxed share is chosen
optimally, the welfare losses for the South relative to the fully-ﬂexible
optimal aid policy are modest. Perhaps counter-intuitively, if the
North has to donate a ﬁxed share of GDP, the costs of this restriction
are sometimes borne by the North in equilibrium: the North becomes
more generous in the long run than it otherwise would, and the South
sometimes does better than it otherwise would.17 We also ﬁnd that, if
aid is ﬁxed as a share of Northern GDP, departures from the optimal
choice of this share are not particularly costly: the donor's objective
function is relatively ﬂat as a function of the aid share.17 This result could be eliminated by alternative policy rules; for example, the share of
aid in Northern GDP could be assumed to be a decreasing function of the GDP per capita
of the South.Fig. 4 compares outcomes when the North can vary aid as a share of
its GDP, andwhen the share is ﬁxed. By construction, the donormust al-
ways do at least as well when free to choose a ﬂexible path for aid, but
the effect of ﬁxing the share on the donor's objective is surprisingly
modest. In our baseline case, the associated utility loss is equivalent to
an ongoing reduction in consumption of 0.2% for the North and South.
Looking at the two economies individually, the restriction to a ﬁxed
share leaves Northern households worse off (− 0.8 %) and Southern
households better off (+ 0.6 %). But this is not always the case. For
some cases with higher ω, the restriction to a ﬁxed share leaves the
North better off and the South worse off. The role of ω hints that these
results arise from the interplay of the beneﬁts of aid at short horizons,
the beneﬁts at long horizons, and whether ﬁxing the aid share is waste-
ful due to absorption constraints. Finally, we limit aid to the Pearson
Commission benchmark, 0.70 % of Northern GDP. Compared to our op-
timal ﬂexible path, themuch lower generositymeans that the HEVwel-
fare gain in the South falls from 11% to 2%.
5. Optimal aid for subsistence economies
We now consider preferences with a subsistence level of consump-
tion. It is well known that the single-sector Ramsey model with
isoelastic preferences makes some unrealistic predictions: fast conver-
gence to the steady-state, and a sharp decline in investment rates and
in the marginal product of capital as capital is accumulated. Nor can it
readily accommodate periods of international divergence in GDP per
Table 2
Output growth in South under alternative subsistence thresholds.
cS 0 0.1 0.25 0.375
Growth 0.0527 0.0473 0.0362 0.0212
Fig. 4. Fixed v. dynamic; baseline case. Optimal aid in our baseline parameterization, comparing the unconstrained dynamic solution (dashed line) to the case inwhich thedonor gives aﬁxed
share of its GDP (solid line). The upper two panels show the optimal paths of aid, relative to Northern and Southern GDP. The lower-left panel shows the change in the Southern net saving
rate (the rate with aid minus the rate without) in both cases. The lower-right panel shows the percentage gain in Southern consumption achieved by aid relative to autarky in both cases.
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countries. Ben-David (1998) and Steger (2009) argue that Stone–
Geary (SG) preferences overcome these problems. Low investment
can co-exist with high returns to investment, because the opportunity
cost of investment is high when households are close to subsistence.
We examine the implications for the generosity and timing of aid, in-
cluding whether donors will want to front-load aid.
Formally, the framework is identical to that used earlier, but with in-
stantaneous utility now given by c jt−c
 1−σ−1
 = 1−σð Þ for j= N, S
where c corresponds to a subsistence level of consumption. With
labor-augmenting technical progress, the ﬁxed subsistence level c inﬂu-
ences the transitional dynamics, but the model will have an asymptotic
balanced growth path; see, for example, Ohanian et al. (2008). The qual-
itative nature of the dynamic path will depend on initial conditions.
Given technical progress, there will ultimately be convergence for a
wide range of initial capital stocks, but the growth and convergence pro-
cess will often be slow. In particular, if the South begins close to subsis-
tence, the growth rates of capital perworker andGDPperworkerwill be
slower than the rate of technical progress for a transitional period, and
living standards will temporarily diverge.
In our experiments, we set the subsistence level so that ten-year
growth in output per capita in a simulation of the South (without aid)
is close to that observed over 1997–2007, assuming labor-augmenting
technical progress of 2 % a year. Table 2 lists the growth rates obtained
from simulations, for alternative choices of c. For our baseline version
of the South, the annual growth rate over 1997–2007 was 3.71 % and
hence we set c ¼ 0:25 for our baseline case. This will turn out to be
roughly 50 % of the initial consumption level for the South in autarky.
As expected, under SG preferences, aid generosity should be high
early in the development process. We present some results in Fig. 5,which could be comparedwith the earlier CRRA results in Fig. 1. The op-
timal level of aid is initially higher under SG preferences, at 9.6% of
Northern GDP. It declines to the same asymptotic level of 2.4% (recall
that the CRRA and SG growth paths are asymptotically equivalent) but
converges to this level more slowly in the SG case. Under SG prefer-
ences, Southern output converges more slowly towards the Northern
level. This is a natural result: when the Southern economy is close to
subsistence, the opportunity cost of investment is high. But the optimal
time path for aid helps to close the gap between North and South to a
greater extent under SG preferences than under CRRA preferences.
This is another natural result, since relaxing the intertemporal resource
constraint is more valuable in the SG case.
The effect of SG preferences on the generosity of aid means that aid
has a greater impact on consumption in the SG case. The peak change in
consumption, relative to autarky, is similar (17% under SG, 14% under
CRRA) but the duration of the effect on consumption differs greatly.
Under SG preferences, Southern consumption is 11% higher than the
zero-aid counterfactual 50 years after the commencement of aid.
Under CRRA preferences, the equivalent ﬁgure is just 6%. This difference
reﬂects the greater generosity of aid in the SG case: aid is 5.5% of North-
ern GDP at t= 50 under SG preferences, but just 2.5% under CRRA. Al-
though the absolute change in the initial annual growth rate, relative
to the zero-aid counterfactual, is similar to the CRRA case at 0.59 per-
centage points, autarky output growth is slower under SG preferences,
Fig. 5. Baseline case: subsistence version.Optimal aid under Stone–Gearypreferences. For ease of comparison, the income convergence panel from Fig. 1, under CRRApreferences, is shown
again here.
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more substantial, multiplying the initial growth rate by 1.17, compared
with a multiple of 1.08 under CRRA preferences.
To compare the SG and CRRA cases in more detail, Fig. 6 shows out-
comes based on the same ﬁxed quantity of aid.19 The higher aid intensi-
ty in the SG case reﬂects the fact that Southern output grows more
slowly under these preferences. The effects of aid on net investment,
consumption and growth are markedly greater in the SG case. Since
our assumptions on preferences vary across the two cases, more direct
welfare comparisons are not meaningful.
6. Optimal aid with two recipients
In this section,we study the donor's problemwhen there are two aid
recipients. Additional recipients can be integrated into the Northern
planner's optimal control problem in the obviousway.Withmultiple re-
cipients, allocation decisions are connected because aid to one country
reduces consumption in the North, increasing the opportunity cost of
aid to other countries.
We construct a low-income recipient, S1, using the countries in the
lowest quarter of the GDP per capita distribution. The other recipient,
S2, is an aggregate of ‘middle income’ countries, deﬁned as those
between the lower and upper quartile of the GDP per capita distribu-
tion. Table 1 lists some of the relevant numbers. We now include
China and India, unlike in our baseline case. As a result, the middle-
income country is ‘large’: the population of S2 is 6.1 times greater
than the population of S1.18 With Stone–Geary preferences and initial conditions close to subsistence consump-
tion, growth accelerates initially in the autarky case. In our baseline SG case, Southern
growth peaks after four years.
19 Theﬁxed level chosen is thatwhich is optimal in the CRRA case. The third panel shows
the percentage point change in the growth rate.Output per capita in S2 is about 19% that of the North, whereas the
poor recipient, S1, has output per capita only 5% that of the North.
Hence, in this ﬁrst experiment, output per capita in S2 is about four
times greater than in S1. The long-run ratio of output per capita
between the two is smaller, however, at 2.5. This is because the initial
capital stock in S1 is further beneath its long-run level than S2. The
ratio k0/k∗ is 0.13 for S1 and 0.35 for S2. Hence, without aid, S1 initially
grows faster than S2: annualized growth is 13% for t=0 in S1, 6% in S2.
This calibration can address an important policy issue: does low con-
sumption help tomotivate aid even for middle-income countries? Fig. 7
illustrates the optimal aid allocation under CRRA preferences. The con-
trast between the two recipients is striking. A substantial amount of
aid is allocated to themiddle-income recipient, and its response is famil-
iar from our baseline case. But despite the poor recipient S1 starting fur-
ther beneath its balanced growth path, and with greater scope for aid-
induced growth, the effect on investment (which mirrors the effect on
output convergence) is negligible. Instead of a front-loaded aid path
that induces accelerated investment, the donor keeps aid intensity
high throughout and increases generosity in absolute terms over time.
This reﬂects the aid absorption constraint: the donor cannot be too gen-
erous to S1 initially, because the optimal quantity of aid already takes
this economy close to the point where the marginal beneﬁt of aid is
zero. The recipient S1 uses aid to fund a higher level of consumption,
with little change in investment behavior, because this recipient cor-
rectly anticipates that aid will increase over time. As for the middle-
income recipient S2, where the population is larger and the absorption
constraint is less binding, the donor is generous early on but then scales
aid back over time as the recipient grows. This is reﬂected in the shares
of the two recipients in total aid: the middle-income recipient receives
the bulk of the aid at shorter horizons, and the low-income recipient
S1 at longer horizons.
To explore further, we change the population of S2 so that itmatches
that of S1. Fig. 8 shows what happens: there is a sharp reduction in the
Fig. 6. Fixed aid: CRRAversus SG. This ﬁgure compares outcomes under Stone–Geary (dashed line) and CRRA (solid line) preferences, for the sameﬁxedﬂowof aid, equal to 5% of Northern
GDP. The lower-left panel shows the difference made to the growth rate by aid compared to autarky. Descriptions of other panels as before.
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The level of aid given to S1 is virtually unchanged, despite the large re-
duction in aid given to S2 with an associated reduction in the opportu-
nity cost of aid to the North. This result arises because S1 is already
being given as much aid as it can effectively absorb.20
7. Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we carry out some sensitivity analyses, and then
discuss possible extensions. First, recall the externality that arises in
our setup: capital accumulation by Southern households increases the
ability of the South to absorb aid. What happens if we take our baseline
calibration and assume Southern decisions are made by a social plan-
ner? The optimal policy for the Northern planner now leaves Northern
households slightly worse off (equilibrium aid is slightly more gener-
ous) and the South slightly better off. The effects on the North are
modest and the optimal path for aid barely differs, compared to the
decentralized version. The peak difference in aid between the two
cases, as a percentage of Northern GDP, is only 0.7 percentage points.
But the change in Southern consumption is noticeable: the Southern
planner anticipates the favorable effect of investment on future aid
absorption, and chooses higher investment rates in the ﬁrst few years
of the transitional dynamics. Overall, however, the quantitative
importance of the externality is modest. We discuss these results in
more detail in an online appendix.
Next, we brieﬂy consider the effects of varying two parameters: σ,
the curvature of the utility function, and α, the output–capital elasticity.
In modifying these parameters, we still require the Northern and
Southern capital–output ratios to match those in the data. Relative to
our previous experiments, there is a direct effect of changing each20 Initial aid intensity is close to 25% of the GDP of recipient S1, the point at which the
marginal beneﬁt of aid to S1 is zero.parameter, and an indirect effect which arises from matching the ob-
served capital–output ratios under new parameter assumptions. The al-
ternative route, of only focusing on the direct effect, would lead to an
inconsistency between the capital–output ratios in the simulations
and those in the data.
As noted earlier, the curvature of the utility function has a major ef-
fect on optimal generosity, especially at longer horizons.When themar-
ginal utility of consumption diminishes less rapidly with consumption,
themotivation for global redistribution is weakened. In our simulations,
with slightly less curvature (σ=1.8 rather than σ=2.0) aid generosity
is reduced and the effect on consumption is smaller. Given technical
progress, the level of the balanced growth path is raised by a reduction
inσ, and the effect of aid on growth is initially stronger than in our base-
line. This effect is modest, however.
Increasing the output–capital elasticity has similarly complicated ef-
fects. It makes aid more effective, since capital accumulation becomes
more important; it also raises the balanced growth path. We do not
present the results in detail, but note that as α increases, the effect of
aid on investment is lower but the effect on growth larger. Intuitively,
because investment now has greater beneﬁts, the South is able to
consume more early on.
We now brieﬂy discuss some possible extensions. Perhaps the most
important modiﬁcation to the analysis would be to introduce political
economy considerations within the South. This would introduce a
major complication, namely strategic interactions between the donor
and recipients. One possibility would be to allow aid to ﬁnance public
investment, as in Chatterjee et al. (2003) and other work summarized
in Turnovsky (2009); see also Lowe et al. (2013). Expenditure on public
investment projects could be wasteful to some degree, with the extent
of waste increasing in expenditure as in Berg et al. (2013). Politics in
the North could also play a role: in principle, the North's objective func-
tion could reﬂect the North seeking political inﬂuence, as in the work of
Antràs and Padró i Miquel (2011).
Fig. 7. Two recipients. A two-recipient case: S1 small and poor, S2 middle-income and populous. The middle panels show the ratios of income and consumption in the two recipients to
Northern levels, under optimal aid and in autarky; for income in the case of S2, the effect is too small to be seen.
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ally, with a risk premium that is increasing in external indebtedness.
van der Ploeg and Venables (2013) examine the optimal response of re-
cipient governments to windfall revenues in such an environment, but
treat the timepath of revenues as exogenous,which seemsbetter suited
for natural resource windfalls than aid ﬂows. Perhaps their decision
problem could be integrated within that of an altruistic North, using
the nested structure we adopt here. A related extension would model
recipients as two-sector economies that produce traded and non-
traded goods, in which case absorption constraints could arise endoge-
nously through Dutch Disease effects.
Staying closer to our current framework, other possibilities include
country-speciﬁc population and technical progress dynamics, costs of
distortionary taxation in the donor, adjustment costs in the North for
aid disbursements, ﬁnite-duration aid commitments by the donor, CES
production technologies, and the introduction of capital varieties; see
Hoxha et al. (2013) on the latter. Amore ambitious extensionwould in-
troduce output volatility in the South, so that aid would have an addi-
tional insurance role. This would bring the analysis closer to Arellano
et al. (2009), at the expense of greater computational complexity.
8. Conclusions
This paper has introduced a framework for analyzing optimal aid
policies using the neoclassical growth model. In contrast to most previ-
ous research, the ﬁndings are based on a clearly-deﬁned optimizationproblem for the Northern donor. It takes into account the opportunity
cost of aid, optimizing behavior by Southern households, and con-
straints on the effective absorption of aid. This framing of the problem
is a ﬁrst step in the direction of a richer quantitative analysis, and the
simulations indicate what might be learnt from future exercises of this
type. Since any tractable model must be stylized, there will always be
a need for subjective judgments on the part of donors; but formal
models can make visible some considerations and possibilities that
would otherwise be obscure.
We ﬁnd that optimal transfers are inﬂuenced by the weight a donor
places on recipient welfare, the curvature of the utility function, the
recipient's capacity to absorb aid, the relative level of the recipient's bal-
anced growth path, and the recipient's initial distance from that growth
path. In our simulations, the scope for aid to raise growth rates plays
some part in aid decisions, but the effect on the level of consumption
often dominates. The optimal generosity of aid, relative to Northern
GDP, should vary over time to reﬂect conditions in aid recipients. In
our baseline case, aid generosity declines over time. But in some scenar-
ios, where donors run up against absorption constraints, there is a time
interval over which generosity should be increasing. As for optimal aid
intensity— that is, aid relative to Southern GDP— this should generally
decline over time. But in cases where the aid absorption constraint is
close to binding, the optimal policy may dictate that high aid intensity
is maintained for a long time. In the case of multiple recipients, the op-
timal policy may involve large changes over time in the absolute quan-
tity of aid and the division of aid between recipients.
Fig. 8. Two recipients: S2 population equal to S1. A two-recipient experiment, with the population of S2 now reduced to match S1.
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consumption is close to subsistence. The effects of aid on Southern con-
sumption, investment and growth can be dramatic in this case. In gen-
eral, our numerical results indicate optimal aid levels that exceed
those in the data, at least at short horizons. An interesting task for future
research is to pin down the features of reality that could explain this dis-
parity. That citizens of donor economies may place little weight upon
the welfare of aid recipients is only one possible explanation; others
could include the potential roles of political economy forces and
corruption in undermining the effectiveness of aid. Given the obvious
importance of these considerations, our approach is a partial view.
Nevertheless, it provides some insights and results that could help to in-
form the design of aid policies, and is simple enough to be extended in
many directions.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2014.11.005.
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